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FEMINISM AND DISCIPLINARITY: THE CURL
OF THE PETALS
Carol Sanger*
I. INTRODUCTION
In this Symposium, feminism has been invited to take a place
alongside such well-established disciplines as history, philosophy, and ec-
onomics in a consolidated exploration of interdisciplinary approaches to
law. While sincerely extended-the feminist entry is not the only one
that women are writing-and generously unbounded as to scope, so that
one might choose from an embarrassment of rich complexities within
feminist legal scholarship, the invitation raises what for many is a prior
question: Is feminism a discipline at all? There are, after all, no Depart-
ments of Feminism, no universally prescribed first year curricula, no
Ph.D.'s. Some would argue that feminism has yet to succeed in "the
traditional strategies by which disciplines stake out their territories and
theoretical paradigms mark their difference: by claiming a particular do-
main of objects, by developing a unique set of methodological practices,
and by carrying forward a founding tradition and lexicon."'
Others might further argue that feminism fails as a discipline not
because of what it isn't, but because of what it is: something more polit-
ical than academic, a movement rather than a branch of knowledge, a
project rather than a field of study. An accompanying claim might be
that feminism is too emotional and so lacks the rigor and detachment of
a discipline. Like Alice among the daisies and roses in Wonderland's
Garden of Live Flowers, something about feminism does not look quite
right to those already firmly rooted. As the Tiger-Lily remarked about
Alice: "'If only her petals curled up a little more, she'd be all right.' "2
A few of the skeptical "some" and many of the "others" just men-
tioned are our colleagues and they not only might make such observa-
tions about feminism's place in the disciplinary garden, they do make
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University Law School; B.A., 1970, Wellesley College;
J.D., 1976, University of Michigan. I am grateful to Jeremy Waldron, Elizabeth Potter, and
Amy Kastely for their comments on earlier drafts and to Mitzie L. Dobson for her fine editing.
1. CARY NELSON ET AL., Cultural Studies: An Introduction, in CULTURAL STUDIES 1, 1
(1992).
2. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS 29 (St. Martin's Press 1977)
(1871).
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them, over lunch and over files at appointments and curriculum meet-
ings. The exact discourse of disciplinarity is not always in play in such
discussions; the problem of sorting out what feminism is and what law
professors are supposed to do with it is often framed instead around the
concept of "seriousness." Disciplinarity and seriousness are, of course,
related. The status of discipline is understood in our business as a
marker of enduring academic importance and legitimacy, an indication
of what is to be taken "seriously."
As the feminist delegate to this interdisciplinary Symposium, I have
therefore taken as my initial task consideration of the issue implicit in the
invitation: feminism's credentials as a discipline. I explore the contours
and curl of feminism's petals in the context of the traditional criteria
used to bestow disciplinary status on a subject, thus qualifying it for sub-
sequent interdisciplinary adventures. My aim, however, is less to come
up with an imperial thumbs up or thumbs down on feminism as a disci-
pline than to think hard about the definition, authority, and functions of
disciplinarity in relation to feminism.
Admittedly, this project presents a dilemma of sorts. Discussing
whether a particular subject counts as a discipline has long been a way of
keeping start-up disciplines such as feminism-or evolution or political
science-on queue, at the margins, or outside the academy all together.
Women's Studies' faculty members have long understood that "when we
are asked, 'Is Women's Studies an academic discipline?' we are being
asked by the unconvinced: 'What are you doing at the university?'"
Certainly within the last twenty years or so, feminism has gained univer-
sity admission, at least at the undergraduate level. "Struggling against
tokenism, the 'add women and stir' approach, co-option and marginal-
ization, feminists have managed to establish a space within educational
institutions from which to document, analyze and theorize the position
of women in society."4 Thus, the question now is less one of feminism's
exclusion than of its legitimacy, or in bell hooks's phrase, the progress of
the trek from "margin to center."'
3. Gloria Bowles, Is Women's Studies an Academic Discipline?, in THEORIES OF WO-
MEN'S STUDIES 32, 38 (Gloria Bowles & Renate Duelli Klein eds., 1983).
4. SARAH FRANKLIN ET AL., Introduction 1: Feminism and Cultural Studies: Pasts,
Presents, Futures, in OFF-CENTRE: FEMINISM AND CULTURAL STUDIES 1, 2 (1991) (discuss-
ing progress of and relation between feminist and cultural studies in Britain). For an excellent
history of the women's studies movement, see Marilyn J. Boxer, For and About Women: The
Theory and Practice of Women's Studies in the United States, in RECONSTRUCTING THE
ACADEMY: WOMEN'S EDUCATION AND WOMEN'S STUDIES 69 (Elizabeth Minnich et al. eds.,
1988) [hereinafter RECONSTRUCTING THE ACADEMY].
5. BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984).
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How then should feminist scholars move out from this beachhead?
The first approach would be to continue efforts to develop courses, grad-
uate programs, scholarly traditions, journals, methodologies, vocabu-
laries, and conferences-the familiar indicia of a discipline-without
worrying about whether feminism itself is already a discipline. To a cer-
tain extent this is happening already, as clusters of scholars throughout
the academic world press on with an enterprise that is at times haphaz-
ard, opportunistic, and contested from within, but that proceeds with or
without properly certified disciplinary credentials. The result may be a
kind of academic adverse possession whereby one day everyone will look
up and say: "Of course feminism is a discipline; it's been one for ages."
The other approach would be to think that it is important now to
establish that feminism is a discipline before proceeding one course or
one appointment further. Under this view, which shapes much of the
formal resistance to feminism, there is to be no possession at all, however
open and notorious the effort. This approach involves explicit submis-
sion to the gate-keeping structure of disciplinarity that by many accounts
is the'very job of feminism to charge.
Whichever approach prevails, my focus on feminism as a discipline
is not to be taken as an unqualified endorsement of disciplinarity as a
prerequisite for proper feminist inclusion within law schools. In the first
place, disciplinarity itself has now come under critical scrutiny. As
David Shumway and Ellen Messer-Davidow explain:
The various connotations of "discipline" have until recently
been entirely positive; to call a branch of knowledge a discipline
was to imply that it was rigorous and legitimate. The name did
not reveal that knowledge was produced by regulating or con-
trolling knowledge-producers, nor that the training of disciples
produced the general acceptance of disciplinary methods and
truths.
6
Indeed, much of the hard work and accomplishment of feminist academ-
ics has been challenging the traditional rules and practices of knowledge
production by insisting on the inclusion of women-as subjects to be
studied, as the investigators of the studies-throughout the university
curriculum.7
6. David R. Shumway & Ellen Messer-Davidow, Disciplinarity: An Introduction, 12 PO-
ETICS TODAY 201, 202 (1991).
7. Margaret Anderson provides a more thorough conception of what "including women"
means:
[T]he complex process of redefining knowledge by making women's experiences a
primary subject for knowledge, conceptualizing women as active agent in the crea-
tion of knowledge, including women's perspectives on knowledge, looking at gender
November 1993]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Moreover, we might decide that the very attributes that distance
feminism from traditional disciplines enhance, not diminish, its value
within the academic garden. A lack of roots, for example, enables femi-
nism, like Alice, to bring back news and perspectives from beyond the
well-manicured hedges. Feminism too has long been aware of the limits
of disciplinarity: "From the beginning, planners feared that departmen-
tal status for women's studies might narrow its focus and limit its impact
by reproducing the male model of fragmented knowledge and bureaucra-
tized isolation."' Indeed, aware of the restrictions inherent in the cate-
gory, not all fields of inquiry even aspire to disciplinary status. Cultural
studies, for example, "[are] not merely inter-disciplinary; [they are] ...
actively and aggressively anti-disciplinary-a characteristic that more or
less ensures a permanently uncomfortable relation to academic
disciplines."
9
My claim here is that whether discipline or not, feminism as a sub-
ject is as an inevitable and inherent part of modem law school curricula
as procedure, ethics, or justice. Ultimately, we may decide that feminism
is a genuine discipline and so include it within the interdisciplinary
scheme suggested by this Symposium, part of law's turn to concepts,
methodologies, and practices from other formal fields of knowledge. 10
Alternatively, we may decide to include feminist concerns simply be-
cause they define subjects worthy of our attention, whether accompanied
by the full retinue of disciplinarity or not.
I proceed with this inquiry in three stages. The first is simply(!) to
define feminism or, at least, to address the complications surrounding the
definition of a project that is at once academic and activist.II Defining
terms-"feminist," "gender," and "feminist criticism"-is particularly
important in a context of persuasion, because feminists tend "to forget
the extent to which our own years of work on these issues [has] given us
an encoded, almost shorthand, system of linguistic reference with which
as fundamental to the articulation of knowledge in Western thought, and seeing wo-
men's and men's experiences in relation to the sex/gender system.
Margaret L. Anderson, Changing the Curriculum in Higher Education, in RECONSTRUCTING
THE ACADEMY, supra note 4, at 38.
8. Boxer, supra note 4, at 96. For the view that Women's Studies should aggressively aim
for disciplinary status, see Sandra Coyner, Women's Studies as an Academic Discipline: Why
and How to Do It, in THEORIES OF WOMEN'S STUDIES, supra note 3, at 46 (suggesting that
feminism may be in pre-paradigmatic Kuhnian stage).
9. NELSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 1-2.
10. See Martha Minow, Law Turning Outward, 73 TELOS 79 (1987).
11. See infra part I.
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we [are] at ease but which [newcomers to the discourse can] neither
translate nor speak." 12
I then turn to the exploration of feminism as a formal discipline,
paying particular attention to the problem of feminism's identification
with the political. 3 I draw here from a developing critical literature on
disciplines-a literature which humbly acknowledges that interdis-
ciplinarity itself is not yet a discipline 4-- and from debates within other
disciplines about what to do about and how to come to grips with femi-
nism. I include in this discussion the rationale and practices of academic
resistance to feminism, especially in law schools. Such resistance stems
in part from what appears to be a deep uncertainty, practiced at both
institutional and individual levels, about whether feminism is a true disci-
pline, an interesting (or horrifying) fad, or just a muddle.
The third part of this Essay moves from consideration of feminism
as formal discipline to the practice of feminism in the study of law.15 My
point of departure is an observation by K.K. Ruthven about the interven-
tion of feminism in the study of English literature:
It was never suggested to male teachers who completed their
formal education before the late 1960s that feminism might
even be remotely relevant to the teaching of English. The re-
sult was that when feminist criticism finally presented itself to
men already in the profession it was construed as merely sup-
plemental to what needed to be known. What was called (mis-
leadingly) the "feminist perspective" was imagined to be
something which trendies would take up and troglodites [sic]
put down, and which the rest of us might mention from time to
12. Susan H. Aiken et al., Trying Transformations: Curriculum Integration and the Prob-
lem of Resistance, in RECONSTRUCTING THE ACADEMY, supra note 4, at 104, 109.
13. See infra part III.
14. Ellen Messer-Davidow explains that recent critical interest in disciplinarity and the
organization and production of academic knowledge is:
now of interest to critics across the intellectual/ideological spectrum ... has been
piqued by a self-reflective turn on the part of many academics about what they and
their colleagues do and also by an instrumentalist turn on the part of those outside
the academy (predominantly conservatives) who dislike what academics do.
Ellen Messer-Davidow, Book Review, 17 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & Soc'Y 676, 677
(1992) (reviewing TONY BECHER, ACADEMIC TRIBES AND TERRITORIES: INTELLECTUAL
ENQUIRY AND THE CULTURES OF DISCIPLINES (1989); MATTEI DOGAN & ROBERT PAHRE,
CREATIVE MARGINALITY: INNOVATION AT THE INTERSECTIONS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
(1990); FEMINIST KNOWLEDGE: CRITIQUE AND CONSTRUCT (Sneja Gunew ed., 1990); JULIE
T. KLEIN, INTERDISCIPLINARITY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE (1990); ELIZABETH K.
MINNICH, TRANSFORMING KNOWLEDGE (1990)).
15. See infra part IV.
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time if it seemed relevant to the interpretation of a particular
text.16
These remarks, which describe law schools as easily as English depart-
ments, raise the question of how law professors who feel similarly stuck
between the "trendies" and the "troglodytes" might go about incorporat-
ing feminism into their everyday work. This part of the Essay offers a
practical response to such concerns by presenting applications of law and
feminism taken from a first-year contracts course.
Of course, trendies and troglodytes should also take note, for as al-
literatively alluring as those two categories may be, neither can be sus-
tained. Feminism is not a fad, not a trend; like rock and roll, it is here to
stay. As for the troglodytes, academia is no Jurassic Park where species
that died out because the whole world changed are now kept alive to
scare younger generations. Those whose legal training preceded or omit-
ted feminism as a concept crucial to the study and practice of law may
survive, but they will survive only so long as feminism remains a margi-
nal or passing phenomenon, an option many think can be safely waited
out. 7 They will be unable to sustain these attitudes when feminist con-
cerns and scholarship are incorporated into law school curricula-not
just as supplemental handouts in courses taught here and there by junior
professors, but as a subject bound between red, blue, and brown covers
throughout the curriculum. The commitment to this undertaking is not
simply a feminist project, but one that demands our collective effort.
II. FEMINISM DEFINED
Before evaluating feminism as a discipline and "law and feminism"
as a pedagogical practice, I want to consider what we mean by "femi-
nism."18 The term itself has become laden with controversy, deeply
politicized, and generally confusing. 9 I therefore decline the self-identi-
16. K.K. RUTHVEN, FEMINIST LITERARY STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION 7 (Canto ed.,
1990).
17. Consider appointments committees that hesitate to hire "feminists" out of concern
that they will have nothing to teach when the fashion fades.
18. For the origins of the term "feminism" and its gradual substitution in the United
States for "women's movement" in the early 1900s, see NANCY F. CoTr, THE GROUNDING OF
MODERN FEMINISM (1987).
19. An example of such confusion: In reading the daily New York Times, I was recently
greeted by a full page blow-up of a conventionally gorgeous model in a bikini accompanied by
the bold caption: "Am I feminist?" Her answer? "Yes.... My magazine [Cosmopolitan] says
equality and achievement are crucial for women but you don't have to stop loving men while
you get there." N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1993, at C20 (advertisement).
A different approach, its definitional pessimism aside, is Rebecca West's sound observa-
tion that "[p]eople call me a feminist whenever I express sentiments that differentiate me from
Vol. 27:225
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fled postmodern approach of some scholars that definition itself is
inappropriate:
In light of the many projects, aspirations, and theories that can
be denominated "feminist," it makes little sense to advance a
definition of feminism. Like all notions, "feminism" has a
grammar for its usage; this grammar, however, is contested.
Hence it seems silly to draw lines when no one [line, I assume]
is entirely reasonable. Better simply to notice and appreciate
the multiplicity of meanings inherent in the term.20
Without question, the term "feminist" entails an inherent multiplic-
ity of meanings. Part of the project of both feminist theorizing and femi-
nist praxis is to differentiate among women.21 Many adjectives modify
"feminism"-cultural, radical, French, postmodem, Africana-American,
first wave, second wave, Chicana, lesbian, Marxist, and conservative.
Each signifies a distinct perspective, a developing literature, and differen-
tiated, sometimes conflicting goals.22 Moreover, these differences play
out within the feminism of each discipline.23 Thus, for readers who may
not appreciate the multiplicities of meanings or who may conclude that
multiplicities and conflicts necessarily disqualify feminism from consider-
ation as a unified discipline, drawing even very thick lines around a core
meaning-and drawing them even in pencil-is not silly at all. Any
a doormat or a prostitute." A WOMAN'S PLACE: QUOTATIONS ABOUT WOMEN 225 (Anne
Stibbs ed., 1992).
20. Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 254, 256 n.8
(1992).
21. At times, even to utter "essentialism" has been to risk immediate sentencing by the
Red Queen.
22. This kind of diversity is not unique to feminism. Sandra Coyner observes:
Psychology, for example, embraces not only experimental and clinical approaches,
but also Freudians and behaviorists. Economists includes Marxists, supply-siders,
and several orientations in between. These different trends within the disciplines are
not complementary; they do not "add up" to form a consistent or somehow more
complete picture. They compete with each other as alternate explanations of the
same phenomena; they too are "distinctive" systems of knowledge.
Coyner, supra note 8, at 48.
23. In literary criticism, for example, Annette Kolodny explains that:
[T]hose who share the term "feminist" nonetheless practice a diversity of critical
strategies, leading, in some cases, to quite different readings, requir[ing] us to ac-
knowledge among ourselves that sister critics, "having chosen to tell a different story,
may in their interpretation identify different aspects of the meanings conveyed by the
same passage."
Annette Kolodny, Dancing Through the Mine-field: Some Observations on the Theory, Prac-
tice, and Politics of a Feminist Literary Criticism, in MEN'S STUDIES MODIFIED: THE IMPACT
OF FEMINISM ON THE ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE 23, 38 (Dale Spender ed., 1981) [hereinafter
MEN'S STUDIES MODIFIED] (quoting M.H. Abrams, The Deconstructive Angel, in CRITICAL
INQUIRY 3 (1977)).
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broad movement-whether feminism, socialism, or conservatism-will
have a degree of sectarianism that impedes efforts to pin down too tight a
definition. Indeed, recognizing differences among women-without the
compulsion to reconcile such differences-is part of the pleasure and
challenge of feminism, not its downfall. Moreover, disagreement is not
disarray. As political theorist Susan Okin points out, feminist theories
"disagree with one another on many counts, arguing with both predeces-
sors and contemporaries on all but the most basic issue-our conviction
that women are human beings in no way inferior to men, who warrant
equal consideration with men in any political or moral theory."24
What matters here is less the perfect definition of "feminist" than
the distinction between feminists themselves and the teaching of femi-
nism. The former is a category of commitment; the latter an obligation
of the profession. It may still be possible in some law schools for a first-
year student to be taught only by nonfeminist professors. But it would
seem impossible, irresponsible, and anti-intellectual for those same stu-
dents not to be exposed to concepts and applications of feminism during
their first year of legal study.
Just as I am not a professional historian, I could not teach first-year
contracts without sustained attention to the history of contract doctrine,
which itself derives from "regular history"; Richard Danzig's article on
the relation between the Industrial Revolution and the foreseeability lim-
itation on damages comes quickly to mind.2" Indeed, directing class-
room attention to social, political, and intellectual histories has become
increasingly necessary with students accustomed to "living in the now."
Similarly, I am not a trained economist-I have not even attended law
and economics summer camp-yet it would be unthinkable to teach con-
tracts without attention to theories of rational choice and wealth max-
imization as well as to critiques of those theories.26 By the same token,
one does not have to be a feminist-or even a woman-to value feminist
insights and to include them in the teaching of law.
This being the case, what then do we understand "feminism" to
mean? Let us consider a definition proposed by Judge Richard Posner, a
master of interdisciplinarity:
24. SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 61 (1989).
25. Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale" A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 249 (1975).
26. It is, of course, much easier to incorporate law and economics than feminism; most
contracts casebooks now include a textual introduction to the former in addition to specific
cases. In contrast, feminist concerns are rarely included as a regular subject in standard
casebooks. I say more about this in part III.
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Properly understood, feminism as a branch of learning is the
study of women in society, with emphasis on the effects on
them of social practices and public policies, with due regard for
what women themselves (often long ignored) have said or say,
with sincere concern for women's welfare, and with a heavy
dose of skepticism about theories of a theocratic or otherwise
dogmatic cast that teach that women are predestined to be
subordinate to men.27
While catching elements of the enterprise, Judge Posner's definition re-
mains unsatisfactory. Feminism even as a branch of learning is some-
thing more than the study of women in society, improved as that study
may be by methodologies at last attentive to women's experiences and by
skepticism toward theories of natural gender subordination. That is,
feminism is something more than description, however thick, and some-
thing more than concern, however sincere.
The "something more" I want to suggest, the "more" that distin-
guishes feminism from the purely academic, is the insistence that women
in society must be studied. Feminism is not just the name of a set of
concerns and interests but the vehicle for the demand that those concerns
and interests be taken seriously. The idea is not that the inclusion of
women is merely some sort of optional curriculum enricher but rather
that "womenless" history, english, law, and so on are fundamentally in-
adequate as the disciplines they represent themselves to be. As Elizabeth
K. Minnich has explained:
[I]t is clear that knowledge that is claimed to be objective and
inclusive yet reflects and perpetuates societal discrimination
and prejudices fails even on its own terms. Knowledge that
was created and has been passed on within a culture that, until
very recently indeed, excluded the majority of humankind from
the activities, positions, and thinking that were considered most
important can hardly be disinterested and politically neutral, as
it claimed to be.28
One mechanism by which "the majority of humankind" gets some
attention is through feminist criticism. I use the phrase to refer to the
aspect of feminist practice that insists on the centrality of gender-in
simplest terms, the social meanings attached to one's biological sex-as a
category of analysis. 29 Some have described feminist criticism as a scan-
27. Richard A. Posner, The Radical Feminist Critique of Sex and Reason, 25 CONN. L.
REv. 515, 515 (1993).
28. ELIZABETH K. MINNICH, TRANSFORMING KNOWLEDGE 34 (1990).
29. Minnich provides a more thorough explication of "gender":
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ning device of sorts, operating like an X-ray or ultrasound "in the service
of a new knowledge which is constructed by rendering visible the hith-
erto invisible component of 'gender.' "30
Law professors of an already interdisciplinary bent may be familiar
with the idea of gender's relevatory power through Susan Glaspell's short
story, A Jury of Her Peers.3" In this story a farm wife is arrested for the
murder of her husband. During the search of the house for evidence,
murder clues and motives abound, invisible to the male sheriff and
county attorney and screamingly apparent to their wives. But as with
the evidence, the wives too are invisible to their husbands and so are not
asked for their observations. The official search party leaves clueless.
The story suggests that what we are able to see is often not a matter of
what is before us, but of the particular qualities of the lens we choose for
the examination.
The commitment to uncovering the significance of gender is not al-
ways driven by feminist concerns. It may also derive from a sense of
integrity internal to the discipline itself. Consider a recent debate among
British historians regarding the revision of the national history curricu-
lum for school children. Historian Raphael Samuels, altogether silent on
feminism, posed the question: Why does the Battle of Trafalgar hold
such an exalted spot in the teaching of English history while the Married
Women's Property Act gets barely a mention?32 Objecting to the ex-
isting curricular hierarchy, Samuels explains that:
The Battle of Trafalgar was no kind of turning point in the
Napoleonic wars, indeed French historians (admittedly a chau-
vinistic lot) barely mention it .... Were it not for the heroic
circumstances of Nelson's death and perhaps (a subject worth
more inquiry) the nineteenth-century romanticization of war, it
is possible that we would know no more of it than we do the
battle of Copenhagen or the landing at Tenerife.33
Gender, in its broadest sense, is the term feminists use to evoke the conceptual and
experiential, individual and systemic, historical and contemporary, cross-cultural
and culture-specific, physical and spiritual and political construction of what it
means to live in a world that has created them not human, but always woman or man
(a division that is not a dualism but a hierarchical monism).
Id. at 136.
30. RUTHVEN, supra note 16, at 24.
31. Susan Glaspell, A Jury of Her Peers, in THE BEST AMERICAN SHORT STORIES 371
(Edward J. O'Brien ed., 1916); Annette Kolodny, A Map for Rereading: Or, Gender and the
Interpretation of Literary Texts, 11 NEw LITERARY HIST. 451 (1980) (analyzing "the insignifi-
cance of [Glaspell's] kitchen things").
32. Raphael Samuels, Heroes Below the Hooves of History, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. 31,
1989, at 23. I thank John Comaroff for introducing me to this material.
33. Id.
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In contrast, Samuels notes:
The Married Women's Property Act, though it gets no more
than a footnote in Haydn's Dictionary of Dates, is a landmark
in the history of women's rights and arguably in the idea of
companionate marriage.... So far as the civil law was con-
cerned, women-at any rate married women-were for the
greater part of this country's existence rightless, not only in re-
lation to goods and chattels but ... in relation to custody of
their children.34
He concludes that: "[i]f the 'free-born Englishman' is to be the epony-
mous hero of 'our island story,' something needs to be said about how the
other half of the nation lived, even though they were, legally and politi-
cally speaking, invisible.""
What I have called feminist criticism, Samuels identifies as the look-
ing for "heroes below the hooves of history," not all of whom are wo-
men.36 To be sure, had women been in high enough places to have had
heroic deaths, a few might have become the stuff of traditional history.
But the deaths of nineteenth-century women were rarely noble-in a
monumental sense-and were instead commonplace, often resulting from
childbirth or pregnancy.
If, as feminist critics, we focus the lens of gender on just this aspect
of women's experience-death-complex worlds unfold to which the
traditional disciplines have begun to attend anew. 37 And if we narrow
the scope still further, and look at women's deaths through lenses ground
and polished by feminist legal scholars, whole areas of law are implicated
and transformed. In evidence, for example, Leslie Reagan's work on the
dying declarations of women who suffered illegal abortions reveals how
state evidence codes were used to enforce criminal abortion statutes.38
Studies in criminal law now consider the differences in defenses available
to men who kill their women partners in contrast to women who kill
men. The medicalization of childbirth, the corresponding regulation of
midwifery, the valuation of a woman's life in terms of compensatory
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See JUDITH W. LEAvrTT, BROUGHT TO BED: CHILDBEARING IN AMERICA, 1750 TO
1950 (1986); IRVINE LOUDON, DEATH IN CHILDBIRTH (1993); SALLY MCMILLEN, MOTHER-
HOOD IN THE OLD SOUTH: PREGNANCY, CHILDBIRTH AND INFANT REARING (1990); MAR-
GARET SANDELOWSKI, PAIN, PLEASURE, AND AMERICAN CHILDBIRTH (1984); RICHARD
WERTZ & DOROTHY WERTZ, LYING-IN: A HISTORY OF CHILDBIRTH IN AMERICA (1977).
38. Leslie J. Reagan, "About to Meet Her Maker" Women, Doctors, Dying Declarations,
and the State's Investigation of Abortion, Chicago, 1867-1940, 77 J. AM. HIST. 1240 (1991).
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damages, and the rules of curtesy compared with dower are all areas
where law increases our understanding of why and how women die and
what the culture chooses to make of their deaths. My object here is not
to outline a new intradisciplinary seminar on Death, Gender, and Law. I
want simply to show, using Samuels's example of Lord Nelson's death as
a starting point, how gender as a category of legal analysis reveals new
ways of thinking about subjects we thought we understood quite well
already.
The practice of feminist criticism returns us to the second and more
political aspect of the "something more" in feminism: a commitment to
doing something about the status of women. I do not mean that Women
with Chalk are out to convert students, though of course students may
choose to become feminists after learning about feminism, just as they
may become historians or mathematicians, even feminist historians and
mathematicians, after engagement with those subjects. Rather, for femi-
nist academics, the personal is not only the political but the professional
as well.
Sometimes educating women is itself activism of immediate and dra-
matic consequence. Amartya Sen's work on female infanticide, for ex-
ample, suggests that in certain provinces of India, the more schooling
girls receive, the less likely they are to be killed during their child-
hoods.39 While feminist academics make few claims to saving lives in
such a crucial, literal sense, we nonetheless understand writing, teaching,
hiring, and tenuring as political acts, however puny that kind of activism
may sometimes feel." Florence Howe clarifies this position:
In the broadest sense of [the] word, teaching is a political act:
some person is choosing, for whatever reasons, to teach a set of
values, ideas, assumptions, and pieces of information, and in so
doing, to omit other values, ideas, assumptions, and pieces of
information. If all those choices form a pattern excluding half
the human race, that is a political act one can hardly help no-
39. Amartya Sen, More than 100 Million Women are Missing, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Dec.
20, 1990, at 61.
40. Regina Austin suggests that this kind of academic contribution does not have to feel all
that insignificant. In setting out a research agenda for other minority women legal scholars,
Austin states:
We should also find inspiration in the modes of resistance black women mount, indi-
vidually and collectively, on a daily basis in response to discrimination and exploita-
tion. . . . As scholars, we in turn can aid their political mobilization with lucid
analyses that offer broad and cogent perspectives of the structural constraints that
produce their subordination and the material openings that must be exploited if fur-
ther freedom is to be achieved.
Regina Austin, Sapphire Unbound!, 1989 WIs. L. REv. 539, 543-44.
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tieing. To omit women entirely makes one kind of political
statement; to include women as a target for humor makes an-
other. To include women with seriousness and vision, and with
some attention to the perspective of women as a hitherto
subordinate group is simply another kind of political act. Edu-
cation is the kind of political act that controls destinies, gives
some persons hope for a particular kind of future, and deprives
others even of ordinary expectations for work and
achievement.41
Deciding which women to include in one's teaching and scholarship
is also political. Consider Regina Austin's question, "When was the last
time you had a student who wanted to write a paper on a topic having to
do with the legal problems of minority women, and you had precious
little to offer in the way of legal articles or commentary that might be on
point?"42 Austin's answer was to write critically about a young black
woman whose problem was being fired, legally, for being a single mother,
and to urge other minority women scholars to locate their scholarship in
"the concrete material and legal conditions of black women."
'43
With all this in mind-if not quite sorted out-we might then settle
on a definition of feminism suggested by Clare Dalton:
Feminism is then the range of committed inquiry and activity
dedicated first, to describing women's subordination-explor-
ing its nature and extent; dedicated second, to asking both
how-through what mechanisms, and why-for what complex
and interwoven reasons-women continue to occupy that posi-
tion; and dedicated third to change. 4
III. THE REQUISITES OF DISCIPLINARITY
We return now to the elements of disciplinarity: those "traditional
strategies by which disciplines stake out their territories ... by claiming a
domain of objects, by developing a unique set of methodological prac-
tices, and by carrying forward a founding tradition and lexicon. '4 In
slightly different terms, "discipline" has come to signify "the tools, meth-
ods, procedures, exampla, concepts, and theories that account coherently
41. FLORENCE HOWE, MYTHS O COEDUCATION 282-83 (1984).
42. Austin, supra note 40, at 541.
43. Id. at 545 (analyzing Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb.
1986), aff'd, 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987)).
44. Clare Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations on the Situation of Feminist Legal
Thought, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 2 (1988).
45. NELSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
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for a set of objects or subjects."4 6 Combining these approximations of
disciplinarity, how does feminism fare? What is the domain or set of
objects or subjects of feminism? Are there distinctive feminist methodol-
ogies, theories, vocabularies, and traditions?
A. Domain
With regard to the subject of domain or turf, Professors Shumway
and Messer-Davidow suggest that feminist inquiry has constituted and
redefined itself around a series of objects:
women as a subjugated sex class and patriarchy as the system
of male dominance; gender (the social character of women and
men) denaturalized and detached from sex (the biological traits
of women and men); sex-gender systems that organize various
cultures; and interactive identities and oppressions, including
those of race, class, sexuality, ethnicity, nationality and
gender.4 7
These topics surely constitute a qualifying domain or constitutive set of
objects, as a review of feminist scholarship throughout the disciplines
reveals.
This elaboration of topics is remarkable when we consider that
when feminists first approached the disciplines, few women could be
found either on the pages of texts or in offices with windows. Looking
just at law, and without detailing the entire dismal record-wife assumed
within husband's legal identity, private/public sphere distinction, exclu-
sion from civic participation, sex-based discrimination, and so on-wo-
men have counted for little. Indeed, legal doctrine itself secured
women's subordination. The same institutionalized invisibility can be
said for anthropology (the study of man), medicine (most research done
on males), philosophy (What is man? What does he know?), theology
(God the father, but few goddesses), architecture (structures by men, in-
terior decoration by women), geography (the man-made environment),
and so on.
But feminist scholars are a dedicated bunch and none of the disci-
plines look quite as they did twenty years ago. Women are now increas-
ingly present within the core conceptualizations of the disciplines.48
46. JULIE T. KLEIN, INTERDISCIPLINARITY: HISTORY, THEORY AND PRACTICE 104
(1990).
47. Shumway & Messer-Davidow, supra note 6, at 215.
48. See THE KNOWLEDGE EXPLOSION: GENERATIONS OF FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP
(Cheris Kramarae & Dale Spender eds., 1992) [hereinafter THE KNOWLEDGE EXPLOSION];
ELLEN C. DuBois ET AL., FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP: KINDLING IN THE GROVES OF
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Feminist geographers have introduced the idea that "space is gendered;
that is, the design and use of space-like all other cultural constructs-is
determined in part by ideological assumptions about gender roles and
relations (for example, the related spatial dichotomies of public and pri-
vate, work and home, city and suburb)."'49 Women in physical education
now teach and participate in real sports with real budgets and fans.5 0
Psychologists are now rethinking certain "truths" concerning women:
Maybe mothers are not the cause of all of their children's problems;
51
maybe women are not more likely than men to be mentally ill. 2
A crucial question for disciplinaity-as well as a strategic question
for feminist scholars themselves-has been whether these subjects are
better studied within existing departmental structures or thematically
bunched into women's studies programs. At some schools the pervasive
or integrative method was preferred in order to secure feminism's place
within every discipline. In other schools advocates favored free-standing
women's studies programs and departments as the means of securing sta-
tus, funds, and longevity. 3 But whether integrated or independent, de-
bate over the institutional location of feminism's highest and best use
cannot sensibly serve as a general eviction notice upon the subject matter
as a whole.
B. Methodologies
If feminism possesses a coherent subject matter, what about distin-
guishing methods and practices? The practice of feminist criticism-re-
ACADEME (1985); FEMINIST KNOWLEDGE: CRITIQUE AND CONSTRUCT (Sneja Gunew ed.,
1990); THE IMPACT OF FEMINIST RESEARCH IN THE ACADEMY (Christie Farnham ed., 1987);
MEN'S STUDIES MODIFIED, supra note 23; RECONSTRUCTING THE ACADEMY, supra note 4;
SEX AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY (Sandra Harding & Jean F. O'Barr eds., 1987).
49. Joni Seager, Women Deserve Spatial Consideration, in THE KNOWLEDGE EXPLOSION,
supra note 48, at 213, 217.
50. Carole A. Oglesby & Christine M. Shelton, Exercise and Sports Studies: Toward a Fit,
Informed, and Joyful Embodiment of Feminism, in THE KNOWLEDGE EXPLOSION, supra note
48, at 181.
51. Mary R. Walsh, Psychology and Feminism, in THE KNOWLEDGE EXPLOSION, supra
note 48, at 291; see Paul Caplan & Ian Hall-McCorquodale, Mother-Blaming in Major Clinical
Journals, 55 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 345 (1985).
52. See the debate between Walter R. Gove and Marilyn Johnson about whether women
have higher rates of mental illness. Walter R. Gove, Mental Illness and Psychiatric Treatment
Among Women, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 102 (Mary R. Walsh ed., 1987); Marilyn
Johnson, Mental Illness and Psychiatric Treatment Among Women: A Response, in THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF WOMEN, supra, at 119.
53. In many cases, feminism's institutional form was a matter of happenstance. See Boxer,
supra note 4, at 96 (explaining that women's studies programs often "developed along the lines
of least resistance: courses here and there, according to faculty interest and administrative
openness; committees composed of whoever was interested and able to participate").
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vealing gender as a category of analysis-serves as a starting point. Of
course, feminist criticism defines a goal, and not the methodologies for
achieving it. Thus an initial question for feminist scholars has been how
to make gender visible. The issue is immediately problematic in that wo-
men have long been discredited as candidates for making very much of
anything visible, and their approaches to understanding long discounted
as sensible ways to learn anything serious.
The basis of such discrediting has been the traditional reverence for
objectivity as an epistemic baseline combined with the fact-objectively
obtained-that women could not reason. 4 As philosopher Lorraine
Code has explained, the identification of women's knowledge with the
hopelessly subjective has been based on
women's purported incapacity to rise above the practical, sen-
suous, and emotional preoccupations of everyday life. Hence
women are judged unfit for the abstract life of pure reason in
which true knowers must engage. So a set of dichotomies con-
tinuous with the subjective/objective dichotomy is invoked:
theory/practice, reason/emotion, universal/particular, mind/
body, abstract/concrete."5
And we all know on which side of the slash women fall.
Thus an initial task of academic feminism has been to redefine what
knowledge is and what counts as knowing. I want to emphasize two
important points about this project of revision. First, the idea here is not
that men have gotten it backwards and that all knowledge is really sub-
jective-though certainly at various stages in certain feminist critiques
that claim has been made. The better argument is that there is and al-
ways has been a subjective quality to knowledge, necessarily situated in
the circumstances of whoever determines what counts as knowledge.
The point has gone unnoticed only because men's subjectivity has defined
the "objective."56 This explains, for example, why the pronoun "he" was
understood by those in control to include rather than to obliterate "she."
54. The nineteenth-century thermodynamic explanation for this predicament was that wo-
men's reproductive organs used the energy that might otherwise have gone into thinking. See
CYNTHIA E. RussETT, SEXUAL SCIENCE: THE VICTORIAN CONSTRUCTION OF WOMAN-
HOOD 104 (1989).
55. LORRAINE CODE, WHAT CAN SHE KNOW?: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE CON-
STRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE 28-29 (1991).
56. Or, as Dale Spender explains:
Most of the knowledge produced in our society has been produced by men; they have
usually generated the explanations and the schemata and have then checked with
each other and vouched for the accuracy and adequacy of their view of the world.
They have created men's studies (the academic curriculum), for, by not acknowledg-
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Feminists are not out to subvert the hierarchies, to replace logic
wholesale with intuition, or to reason with empathy. Rather, they value
the subjective and experiential as informing how we conceptualize
problems and questions and how we formulate and test answers. As Eve-
lyn Fox Keller explains in the context of feminism and science, feminists
seek to escape
the ideology that asserts an opposition between (male) objectiv-
ity and (female) subjectivity and denies the possibility of media-
tion between the two. A first step, therefore, in extending the
feminist critique to the foundations of scientific thought is to
reconceptualize objectivity as a dialectical process so as to al-
low for the possibility of distinguishing the objective effort from
the objectivist illusion.57
The second point is that much of what women have known is not
"subjective" in any epistemically disqualifying way, but is in fact good
reliable information. Nonetheless, as Lorraine Code makes clear, au-
thoritative status was withheld even from the knowledge women con-
structed from their own designated areas of experience:
'Gossip', 'old wives' tales', 'women's lore', 'witchcraft' are just
some of the labels patriarchal societies attach to women's accu-
mulated knowledge and wisdom. Yet the knowledge in ques-
tion stands up to the most stringent tests that even the
objectivists require. It is testable in practice across a wide vari-
ety of circumstances. (Think, for example, of midwifery or
cookery.) Its theoretical soundness is evident in its practical
applications.5 8
The problem in all this for feminist scholars is clear. Both the topic
of women and the methodologies employed to study the topic bear the
continued burden of longstanding depreciation. The connection between
women's invisibility and discredited methodologies is, of course, no acci-
dent. The invisible is not invisible by chance; part of the process of hid-
ing information about women has involved discounting the very
processes that would reveal it. This puts feminist scholarship in a curi-
ous squeeze. What has been long covered is not always subject to sudden
ing that they are presenting only the explanations of men, they have 'passed off' this
knowledge as human knowledge.
DALE SPENDER, Introduction to MEN'S STUDIES MODIFIED, supra note 23, at 1.
57. Evelyn F. Keller, Feminism and Science, in SEX AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY, supra note
48, at 232, 238.
58. CODE, supra note 55, at 68 (explaining that examples chosen "from practices com-
monly classified as trivial, women's work to show that the knowledge derived even out of such
denigrated practices is wholly worthy of the name").
November 1993]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
exposure and must instead be teased out, approached slyly and indi-
rectly. For example, many ventures in law and literature are attempts to
reveal what might, under different traditions of knowing, be obvious and
clear but that are instead veiled and obscure.5 9 Strategies most likely to
reveal women's experience are often less familiar and more suspect. Re-
gina Austin reviews the problem and the obligation of solution in the
context of law:
The world with which many legal scholars deal is that found
within the four corners of judicial opinions. If the decisions
and the rubrics they apply pay no attention to race, sex, and
class .... [I]t is thus imperative that we find a way to portray,
almost construct for a legal audience, the contemporary reality
of the disparate groups of minority women about whom we
write. 60
How then have feminist scholars proceeded? What are feminist re-
search methods? The specifics vary according to discipline. In journal-
ism, feminist scholars have sought "other ways to interpret texts and
images than quantitative content analysis, other forms of interviewing
than the predetermined survey, other ways of understanding women's
experiences than the laboratory experiment.161 Feminist biologists are
now reassessing the long standing "androcentric assumptions" regarding
data description and inferences from data. A feminist contribution to
methodology in evolutionary studies, for example, is not uncovering new
data, but providing a woman-centered framework as an alternative to the
standard "man-the-hunter" story. The aim is not prehistoric politics
(woman-gatherers used tools first!), but rather that whatever conclusions
are reached about the use and meaning of early tools take framework
59. James White explains:
Reading texts composed by other minds in other worlds can help us see more clearly
(what is otherwise nearly invisible) the force and meaning of the habits of mind and
language in which we have been brought up, as lawyers and as people, and to which
we shall in all likelihood remain unconscious unless led to perceive or imagine other
worlds.
James B. White, What a Lawyer Can Learn from Literature, 102 HARV. L. R-V. 2014, 2023
(1989) (reviewing RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELA-
TION (1988)); see, ag., CAROL SANGER, SEPARATING FROM CHILDREN: LEGAL AND LITER-
ARY RESPONSES TO MOTHER-CHILD SEPARATIONS (forthcoming 1994); Carolyn Heilbrun &
Judith Resnik, Convergences: Law, Literature, and Feminism, 99 YALE L.J. 1913 (1990);
Martha Minow, Identities, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97 (1991).
60. Austin, supra note 40, at 547.
61. Lana F. Rakow, What's a Nice Feminist Like You Doing in Journalism and Mass Com-
munication?, in THE KNOWLEDGE EXPLOSION, supra note 48, at 191, 195.
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assumptions into account in assigning evidential relevance to data.62 In
law, traditional legal reasoning-deduction, induction, analogy, and so
on-has been joined and enriched by what Katherine Bartlett identifies
as "feminist legal methods."' 63  These include such practices as con-
sciousness-raising, "asking the woman question"-identifying whether
and how any particular rule disadvantages women-and "feminist prac-
tical reasoning"-a form of contextualized deliberation that takes into
account the material conditions of women's lives.'
What is shared throughout the disciplines is the commitment to val-
uing the experiences, insights, and logic of women's lives and women's
reasoning. In addition to traditional forms of analytical reasoning in
which we have been schooled, feminist scholars also observe, participate,
and ask questions of those under the hooves and outside the texts. We
turn to nontraditional accounts and sources, contextualize, collaborate,
engage in consciousness-raising.65
In her excellent analysis of feminist research across disciplines, Shu-
lamit Reinharz explains how even traditional research methods-inter-
viewing, ethnography, oral history, content analysis, case studies,
experimental research, statistical research formats-are transformed by a
feminist ethic into feminist methodologies.66 Thus, while there is noth-
ing new about interviewing as a research technique, there are different
manners of interviewing, of formulating the questions, of understanding
one's own responses to the answers, of caring about the interviewee as
well as her story, and of attending to the ethical issues raised by inter-
viewing. Reinharz concludes that "by listening to women speak, under-
standing women's membership in particular social systems, and
establishing the distribution of phenomena accessible only through sensi-
tive interviewing, feminist interview researchers have uncovered previ-
62. Helen Longino & Ruth Doell, Body, Bias, and Behavior: A Comparative Analysis of
Reasoning in Two Areas of Biological Science, in SEX AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY, supra note 48,
at 165, 172.
63. Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829 (1990).
64. See generally id. (exploring consciousness-raising, "the woman question," and feminist
practical reasoning); Heather R. Wisknik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist
Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 64 (1985) (examining developmental nature of
feminist legal criticism and its methodological implications).
65. To be sure, feminism has not "invented" all of these. Anthropologist Micaela di Leo-
nardo acknowledges feminism's "intellectual inheritances": For example, "[a]ttempts to un-
dermine power differentials between fieldworker and informant stem from liberal, Marxist and
especially phenomenological insights concerning power and interaction."- Micaela di Leo-
nardo, Women, Culture, and Society Revisited: Feminist Anthropology for the 1990s, in THE
KNOWLEDGE EXPLOSION, supra note 48, at 121.
66. SHULAMIT REINHARZ, FEMINIST METHODS IN SOCIAL RESEARCH (1992).
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ously neglected or misunderstood worlds of experience ' ' 67 in areas such
as rape and "worker happiness," among others.
Reinharz identifies ten general themes that define feminist research:
1. Feminism is a perspective, not a research method.
2. Feminists use a multiplicity of research methods.
3. Feminist research involves an ongoing criticism of
nonfeminist scholarship.
4. Feminist research is guided by feminist theory.
5. Feminist research may be transdisciplinary.
6. Feminist research aims to create social change.
7. Feminist research strives to represent human diversity.
8. Feminist research frequently includes the researcher as a
person.
9. Feminist research frequently attempts to develop special re-
lations with the people studied (in interactive research).
10. Feminist research frequently defines a special relation with
the reader. 8
Many of these practices, which reveal lives and relationships, problems,
and analyses previously undetected, are still regarded as "lore," not in its
best sense as valid, detailed explanation of experience, but as some sort of
academic divining. Sustained skepticism toward feminist methodologies
is especially puzzling in that when employed in other disciplines, such as
history, similar methodologies are accepted as part of the enterprise of
understanding the past.69 But when identified as feminist and applied to
women's issues, such practices are discounted at a higher rate.
Much of the favoring of certain methodologies over others-usually
something quantitative over something qualitative-relates back to the
uncritical reverence of the old version of objectivity. The institutional
power of disciplinarity reinforces such preferences:
Just as civil regulation established the cognitive exclusiveness of
lawyers and physicians in their respective domains, the univer-
sity enabled disciplinary practitioners to achieve cognitive ex-
clusiveness over their regions of the academic world. These
practitioners relied not on licensing but on credentialing; they
67. Id. at 44.
68. Id. at 240.
69. JOHN BOSWELL, THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS: THE ABANDONMENT OF CHIL-
DREN IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM LATE ANTIQUITY TO THE RENAISSANCE 5-10 (1988)
(comparing historians to paleontologists-trying to make sense of assembled bones-and to
detectives-trying to find bones in first place).
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controlled the apparatus for training practitioners and admit-
ting them to their ranks.7'
Cognitive exclusiveness is secured by controlling not only who is hired,
but also what is taught, researched, funded, published, evaluated, and
rewarded. "Problem" methodologies are nonstarters all the way down.
Consider the comment that many of us have heard in regard to a candi-
date's feminist scholarship: "It might be good, but we have no one and
no way to evaluate it."71
This is not to say that feminist practices are unproblematic, even
among feminists. How, for example, should feminists deal with the au-
thority of "women's experience" when the experience or desires articu-
lated by some women-for motherhood, for pornography, for high
heels-are seen by others as the absolute essence of gender subordina-
tion? Are these women the subjects of false consciousness? Are they
collaborators? Biologically determined? Culturally bound? All white?
The answers, and some of the questions, are still being worked out. Ap-
parent contradictions or conflicts have required scholars to look more
carefully at the breadth and foundations of various early-sometimes
called "first wave"-positions. These include confident but monolithic
claims about "women and their problems," the valorization of subjectiv-
ity as utterly distinct from the objective and, in law, prematurely staking
too much of the feminist claim on equality without sufficiently attending
to the demands of difference.
As the evidence comes in, as challenges are issued, feminists con-
tinue to refine their observations and conclusions and to think through
the implications of feminist theory. Consider two examples concerning
reproduction, long understood to be a central cause of women's subordi-
nation and so the subject of much feminist attention. The first concerns
Nancy Chodorow's psychoanalytic explanation that women are the way
they are-connected, maternal-in crucial part because women have
been raised by caretakers of the same sex.72 While many feminists have
used and developed Chodorow's ideas, others have found them too lo-
cated in white, middle-class family patterns to explain why all women
70. Shumway & Messer-Davidow, supra note 6, at 207.
71. See Mary I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO. L.
REV. 683 (1992); Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholar-
ship, 80 CAL. L. REv. 889 (1992).
72. See NANCY CHODOROV, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 77 (1978).
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still raise most children. 3 This is only to say that Chodorow has
presented a theory that other feminists are now challenging. Philosopher
Elizabeth Young-Bruehl directs us to a different aspect of Chodorow's
work-the implications of its success.74 That is, if social aims of
Chodorow's theory come into being so that men begin to take care of
children, that does not end the feminist inquiry:
If shared parenting, one of the most frequently advocated social
goals, is seen as the way to break up a social syndrome of the
reproduction of mothering (in Nancy Chodorow's phrase) and
to bring about the autonomy which too much embeddedness in
relationship has kept unavailable to women, then this common
caution asks that advocates of shared parenting not neglect
processes of the psyche that may very well go on in any kind of
parenting.
75
A second era in which feminists must continue to attend to the im-
plications of theory is reproduction. Having spent years trying to secure
a right to abort, feminists are now confronting all sorts of women who
want to have children-aging yuppies, HIV-positive women, teenagers,
women who become mothers through contractual obligation.76 Femi-
nists now argue with one another about the regulation of maternal health
during pregnancy, about the uses of reproductive technologies, and about
the value of motherhood itself. How should we think about what
Marjorie Shultz calls "intentional parenting, '77 when "surrogate
mothers" enroll in the plan?78 Working out these sorts of difficulties and
developments are part of the excitement-challenge, adventure, risk, and
complexity-of feminism. Fermat's last theorem tantalized mathemati-
cians for 350 years. That all the proofs are not yet in for the many com-
plex hypotheses offered by feminist theorists is neither surprising and
certainly not disqualifying.
73. See generally Judith Lorber et al., On the Reproduction of Mothering: A Methodologi-
cal Debate, 6 SIGNs: J. WOMEN CULTURE & Soc'Y 482 (1981) (stating that move toward
psychoanalytic theory regarding mothering is mistake).
74. Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, The Education of Women as Philosophers, in RECONSTRUCT-
ING THE ACADEMY, supra note 4, at 9.
75. Id. at 20.
76. See Carol Sanger, M isfor the Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 15
(1992).
77. Marjorie M. Shultz, Reproductive Technologies and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Op-
portunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 297 (stating that today, with advances in
birth control and artificial insemination, there is more choice as to when (and if) to become
parent).
78. Id.
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What is now clearly "in" are the critical foundations of a feminist
canon. Different disciplines are at different stages, if we follow Peggy
McIntosh's description of the five-phase process of transformation.79 In
phase one, the disciplines-history, political science, law, and so on-
start out "womanless."80 As feminist claims are raised, the next step is
scouting out what, if any, famous women can be found in the field."1
This phase is a mixed blessing in that the famous women are never as
famous as the famous men. (Let's hear it for Myra Bradwell-the first
woman officially denied admission to the bar by the United States
Supreme Court) 2 Mathematics and engineering may still be in phase
two. 3 Professor McIntosh's third phase is "woman as problem, anom-
aly, or absence"; 4 the fourth is the exuberant but often unbalanced
"women as history."8 5 This all leads up to phase five, where real trans-
formation is accomplished as the discipline is "redefined, reconstructed
to include us all."86 Law is in, or we must immediately catapult it into,
phase five.
In addition to the developments within each particular dis-
cipline, scholarship on certain overarching issues further consti-
tutes the discipline of feminism. These include such crosscutting
themes as the power of linguistic conventions,87 theories of patri-
79. PEGGY MCINTOSH, INTERACTIVE PHASES OF CURRICULAR RE-VISION: A FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVE (Wellesley College Center for Research on Women Working Paper No. 124,
1983).
80. Id. at 3, 7.
81. Id. at 7-9.
82. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). Scholars are now attending to the
lives and circumstances of early women lawyers who were admitted to practice. See Barbara
A. Babcock, Clara Shortridge Foltz: Constitution-Maker, 66 IND. L.J. 849 (1991); Sylvia A.
Law, Crystal Eastman: N.Y U. Law Graduate, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1963 (1991).
83. See, e.g., Robyn Arianrhod, Physics and Mathematics, Reality and Language, in THE
KNOWLEDGE EXPLOSION, supra note 48, at 41; H. Patricia Hynes, Feminism and Engineer-
ing: The Inroads, in THE KNOWLEDGE EXPLOSION, supra note 48, at 133.
84. MCINTOSH, supra note 79, at 9-14.
85. Id. at 19-20.
86. Id. at 20.
87. See DALE SPENDER, MAN MADE LANGUAGE (1980); BARRIE THORNE ET AL., LAN-
GUAGE, GENDER AND SOCIETY (1983). For a more practical perspective, see CASEY MILLER
& KATE SWIFT, THE HANDBOOK OF NONSEXIST WRITING: FOR WRITERS, EDITORS AND
SPEAKERS (2d ed. 1988).
The use of "man" to mean "men and women" is for many feminists a crucial mechanism
for the conceptual invisibility of women, and Dale Spender argues with great force that this
usage did not arise "mysteriously" but is instead a classic example of how "men generated this
meaning and checked with each other to establish its 'logic' and validity." SPENDER, supra
note 56, at 6. Many men, however, still regard the issue of pronouns as a matter of grammar
rather than an inherent feature of the gendered construction of knowledge. See, e.g., Phillip
Areeda, Always a Borrower: Law and Other Disciplines, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1029, 1029 n.2 ("I
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archy,88 conflicts among women on account of difference,8 9 and strate-
gies for change based on commonalities from shared aspects of women's
lives. These themes are also central to the feminist legal canon now tak-
ing solid shape. There are now at least four anthologies of feminist legal
scholarship 90 and three new textbooks,91 although the absence of women
and feminist concerns from casebooks not specially devoted to women's
issues remains a problem.
C. Resistance
If feminism has the attributes of at least an incipient discipline, what
then are the sources of reluctance/resistance to its integration within the
traditional curricula? To put the question more generally, why for all its
traditional strengths, is feminism still disliked, mistrusted, and rejected
in many quarters as an appropriate subject for scholarly devotion and
scholarly reward? There are common, often sensible, objections to any
attempt at curriculum reform.92 Two such common objections are that
the subject is not important enough, and even if it is, so are a lot of other
subjects. There is simply not room in the curriculum or time in the day
to teach it all.
I have already discussed the first, the verdict of insignificance, that
previously disqualified half of humanity as participants or topics in the
use such words as 'man' or 'he' in their universal, not gender-specific, senses."). I would argue
that Professor Areeda and others should consider the idea that for many women, the "univer-
sal" meaning of masculine pronouns asks too much. Would men be able, even after years of
working with a revised grammar, to feel at home within a universal "she"?
88. See DuBois ET AL., supra note 48, at 86. See generally Cheris Kramarae, The Condi-
tion of Patriarchy, in THE KNOWLEDGE EXPLOSION, supra note 48, at 397 (reviewing feminist
discussions on whether concept of patriarchy provides promise or pitfall for understanding
history of man's antagonism towards women).
89. See generally CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn F. Keller eds.,
1990) (discussing conflicts among women).
90. AT THE BOUNDARIES OF THE LAW (Martha A. Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen
eds., 1991); FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE (Patricia Smith ed., 1992); FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
(D. Kelley Weisberg ed., 1993); FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN GENDER AND
LAW (Katherine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991).
91. KATHERINE T. BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMEN-
TARY (1993); MARY BECKER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE:
TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY (forthcoming); MARY JOE FRUG, WOMEN AND THE LAW
(1992). These materials join the earlier genre of texts on women and law focusing on sex
discrimination. See HERMA HILL KAY, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEX-BASED DIS-
CRIMINATION (3d ed. 1988); BARBARA A. BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE
LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES (1975).
92. See generally Lewis D. Solomon, Perspectives on Curriculum Reform in Law Schools:
A Critical Assessment, 24 U. TOL. L. REv. 1 (1992) (discussing efforts to restructure first-year
law curriculum).
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academic world. With regard to the second objection-why study wo-
men "over" racial minorities or poor people or law and economics? The
answer is easy. These other areas should be included within the curricu-
lum. They too are embedded, if just surfacing, in much of what we
teach. They too do not so much crowd as enhance our traditional
courses. There is more likely to be overlap than conflict between any of
these newer concerns and the study of feminism. Teaching about women
often means teaching about race, class, and rational choice. It is no acci-
dent that the plaintiffs in habitability cases are most often poor women or
that widows throughout the canon usually win or that women rationally
consent to many bad deals. The job of the feminist critique is to ask why
this is so. Reconsider Mrs. Williams, the signer of the unconscionable
cross-collateral agreement in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co. 93 Law professors often attend to the fact that she is poor, but does it
matter as well that she is African-American (can one even tell from the
case alone?) or that she is a woman? Does it matter what race the sales-
man was? Or that she signed the agreement in her home? Did all cus-
tomers pay the same original price for the stereo? Might we not be in the
new territory of race and gender discrimination in consumer sales sug-
gested by Ian Ayres's economic analysis of new car sales?
94
In addition to standard objections to the introduction of any new
subject or field, there are certain nonacademic explanations for the par-
ticularly hearty strains of resistance that confront feminism. I begin with
the observations of British feminist Janet Radcliffe Richards, who ex-
plains that feminism is by its very nature quite difficult to get across:
The phenomenon of sexual injustice, of taking it for granted
that different kinds of treatment are suitable for men and wo-
men as such, is so pervasive, so deeply entrenched and so gener-
ally taken for granted that to recognize it for what it is is to
have a view of the world which is radically different from that
of most people. The feminist sees what is generally invisible,
finds significance in what is unremarkable, and questions what
is presupposed by other enquiries. And since to the uninitiated
this is bound to appear no different from imagining the nonexis-
tent, making a fuss about nothing, and gratuitously instigating
disturbances in the foundations of society, perhaps it is not sur-
93. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
94. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiation,
104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991).
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prising that there is still not very much public sympathy with
feminism.9"
Deborah Rhode develops this notion further in her discussion of
what she has identified as "'the no-problem' problem." 96 This is the
phenomenon that "[flor most Americans, gender inequality is not a seri-
ous problem, or it is not their problem."'97 Rhode explains that adher-
ents of the "no-problem" response to sexual inequality can choose from a
variety of supportive cultural beliefs. These include the outright denial
of gender disparities, the recognition of disparities but the denial of their
injustice, and the acknowledgment by some that sex-based discrimination
may exist but that it is likely caused by women themselves.9 Any proof
of improvement-a few women hired, a few successes here and there-
confirms the original diagnosis of "no-problem." This complex system
of belief and absolution makes feminist activity seem all the more like
invention and whining.
A second explanation for feminism's lack of embrace by the public,
colleagues, institutions, and even close relatives, is the matter of its "ap-
pearance or attractiveness." As Janet Radcliffe Richards has bravely
pointed out, many people simply "think of the movement as an inher-
ently unattractive one. They dislike what they see of both feminists and
feminist policies, and the result is not only a disinclination to join with
feminists, but even a resistance to listening to what they have to say." 99
Richards offers several explanations for this: the fact that feminism "suf-
fers from a natural hazard of all reforming movements, of being identi-
fied in the public eye with [its] conspicuous extremes"; 1" that feminists
have had to be noisy, if not shrill, to be heard at all; 101 and that feminists
have at times urged radical solutions-no men, no make-up, no fami-
lies-as the only cure for gender oppression.10 2 John Siliciano offers an
academic version of these same traits: "a propensity towards exclusion-
ary jargon, a smugness of conviction, and a tolerance for some true fanat-
ics among the rank and file." ' 3 However, Siliciano notes that in this
95. JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS, THE SKEPTICAL FEMINIST: A PHILOSOPHICAL EN-
QUIRY 321 (1980).
96. Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural
Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731 (1991).
97. Id. at 1735.
98. Id.
99. RICHARDS, supra note 95, at 338.
100. Id. at 339.
101. Id. at 340.
102. Id. at 346-47.
103. John A. Siliciano, Fighting with Angry Women: A Response to Lasson, 42 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 461, 461 (1992) (commenting on inadequacies in Kenneth Lasson's attack on "femi-
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regard, "feminism is no different from any of the other emerging schools
of thought, like critical legal studies or the law and economics move-
ment, that compete for attention and adherents among legal
academics." 1
Nonetheless, calling something feminist-whether a candidate,
someone's scholarship, a proposed program, or an idea-changes
whatever debate follows.1"' Even feminists are sometimes reluctant to so
identify. After I taught my school's first Feminist Jurisprudence course
in 1989, a number of students, enthusiastic about the content of the
course, nonetheless requested that its title be changed to something else,
something without the word "feminist" in it. They explained that the job
market was bad enough without having the "F-word" on their perma-
nent transcripts.1"6 A similar skittishness may explain why most Wo-
men's Studies Programs, concerned with funding as well as job
placement for graduates, are so called-as opposed to Feminist Studies-
and why, of the many new law school gender journals, 10 7 only Yale's has
the word "feminism" in the title-they must not have problems getting
jobs.108 Consider also women who preface some modest complaint or
well-taken observation with the disclaimer that "I'm not a feminist,
but .... "
Because it is not my view that feminists are especially obnoxious or
any more opinionated than male colleagues committed to some impor-
nism" as represented by Lasson's choice of Catherine MacKinnon quotes). See (or better yet,
don't see) Kenneth Lasson, Feminism Awry: Excesses in the Pursuit ofRights and Trifles, 42 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1992). In response to Lasson, MacKinnon contemplates punching him in the
nose and suing the journal. Catherine MacKinnon, Letter to the Editor, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC.
465 (1992).
104. Siliciano, supra note 103, at 461.
105. It is worth noting that feminist scholarship research, concerned with identifying, un-
derstanding, and changing the subordinated status of women, enters law schools without much
fuss when it is not immediately characterized as feminist. Consider two recent examples from
economics and linguistics. Gregory Matoesian's conversational analysis of rape trial tran-
scripts shows how linguistic conventions reproduce male dominance through the stylized dis-
course of interrogation and examination at trial. GREGORY MATOESIAN, REPRODUCING
RAPE: DOMINATION THROUGH TALK IN THE COURTROOM (1993). Ian Ayres's empirical
analysis of price differentials in new car sales suggests that black men, black women, and white
women pay more for cars than do white men. See Ayres, supra note 94, at 819. While both
are works of feminist criticism, I suspect that neither author will be accused of ideological
motivation.
106. The course is now called "Contemporary Legal Theory" and its changing contents-
feminist jurisprudence, law and economics, critical race theory, and so on-are announced
yearly in the registration materials.
107. See, for example, Berkeley Women's Law Journal, Columbia Journal of Gender and
Law, Harvard Women's Law Journal, Southern California Review of Law and Women's Stud-
ies, and Stanford Journal of Law, Gender and Sexual Orientation.
108. See the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism.
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tant issue, I want to advance a third explanation for resistance to femi-
nism of even the mildest variety. This is simply that feminism is an
explicitly gendered proposition. It is about women. Without paragraphs
of citation, we might agree that at least at this stage of human social and
political relations, women make men nervous. This results in a combina-
tion of social discomfort, intellectual mistrust, and terror. For many
people, too much in too many areas of life has been put up for renegoti-
ation. Taking feminism seriously, both as a branch of study and as a
social movement, necessarily requires some acceptance of sometimes
threatening shifts in the distribution of power and status. In conse-
quence, discussions about curriculum transformation may well provoke
anxieties at an emotional level."9 Alice in the Garden of Live Flowers
was explicit on this point: "'If you don't hold your tongues, I'll pick
you.' ,110
This is bad news for feminist scholars in at least two respects. First,
it is often hard to recognize or respond to opposition grounded in unar-
ticulated dissatisfactions, what Susan Aiken calls the "subterranean emo-
tional text of this discourse." '111 Second, to suggest in any academic
setting that an emotional subtext is at work is to "risk reconfirming the
stereotypical prejudices that have for so long prevented [women] from
being taken seriously within an academy which requires 'objectivity.' ",112
That is, noticing or naming this aspect of resistance reaffirms the charge
that women reduce everything to "feelings"-just as everyone suspected
all along.
In law schools and within the legal profession-institutions not so
very long ago solidly and comfortably male-particular grounds for un-
easiness exist. Women continue to show up yearly in larger numbers,
both in classes and in court where they are now educated enough to be
109. As Susan Aiken and her colleagues discovered in their four-year interdisciplinary inte-
gration project at the University of Arizona:
Because feminist scholarship's insistence on the social construction of gender ine-
quality constitutes an implicit (and sometimes explicit) critique of men, it challenges
masculine self-images and involves many men in a curious dilemma. If they assume
both their own agency in social processes and the injustice of women's secondary
status, then they must acknowledge complicity in gender imbalance.... [R]efusal or
failure to initiate changes creates guilt and dissonance between their actions and their
self-images as just and thoughtful people .... For [those] who see themselves as
liberal and sympathetic to women, yet who resist the thoroughgoing transformation
implicit in the feminist project, the implications of this conundrum are all the more
stinging.
Aiken et al., supra note 12, at 111-12.
110. CARROLL, supra note 2, at 31.
11. Aiken et al., supra note 12, at 113.
112. Id.
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lawyers, propertied enough to be litigants, dangerous enough to be crimi-
nal defendants, and as always, compromised enough to make up the en-
tire courthouse staff. Their physical presence alone may be unsettling,
especially when women and women's issues turn up not only in force but
in places where authorities were sure they could not possibly be, such as
the federal courts. As the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force re-
cently reported, women have a substantial, if unexpected, presence
throughout the federal system by virtue of women's interests in federal
benefits, immigration, federal Indian law, bankruptcy, and the Employ-
ment Retirement Income Security Act.
1 1 3
We know from Alfred Hitchcock that noticing a previously unno-
ticed other, especially when she appears in force, can be terrifying: Re-
call Tippi Hedren in The Birds, not so unlike the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, suddenly aware that she too is surrounded by rows and rows of
birds poised on every line and fence. Unlike Mr. Hitchcock's birds, femi-
nist academics and lawyers do not want to take over the whole town.
They do, however, want to change its layout.
And here we shift from ornithology back to disciplinarity, for the
discourse of discipline is consistently invoked to discredit feminism's de-
mands for structural change-in curricula, in research, in hiring-on the
grounds that feminism is too political for institutional embrace. In law
schools-as in the "hard" sciences-the application of feminism to law,
with its pretenses to apoliticality, is perceived as particularly worrisome.
What responses are there to the resilient claim that feminism is too
political to take up long-term residence in the legal academy? I suggest
four. The first is to concede that feminism is political, in the sense that
its origins and goals reflect a commitment to improving the lives of wo-
men.I 4 But in this sense, the "political" character of feminism is little
different from the political character of law in general-except for femi-
nism's explicit inclusion of women. Open any textbook on jurisprudence
and you will find an introductory disquisition on how we all benefit from
the rule of law, how a stable legal structure is a great thing for society,
and so on. Feminism is political in that it explicitly addresses the task of
113. Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, Preliminary Report of the Ninth Circuit Gen-
der Bias Task Force (July 1992) (Discussion Draft, on file with author).
114. Thus, we must take seriously Annette Kolodny's plea that
to study the women who helped make universal enfranchisement a political reality
while keeping silent about our activist colleagues who are denied promotion or ten-
ure; to include segments on 'Women in the Labor Movement' in our American Stud-
ies or Women's Studies courses while remaining wilfully ignorant of the department
secretary fired for her efforts to organize a clerical workers' union ... is not merely
hypocritical; it destroys both the spirit and the meaning of what we are about.
Kolodny, supra note 23, at 40-41.
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redeeming such promises so far as one-half of society is concerned.
Traditional law is "apolitical" only to the extent that it denies a problem
exists and is uninterested in whether the boasts of general jurisprudence
are ever true.
Second, to the extent that the charge of feminism as politics refers
not to its general social goals but to the attack on the canon, we should
remember that such politicality is hardly a feminist invention hurled
upon the otherwise apolitical enterprise of knowledge production. As I
have discussed above, work in feminist epistemology across a variety of
disciplines has deflated the claim that knowledge has ever been wholly
neutral in content or construction. Nonetheless, the claim manages to
stay aloft. Feminist scholarship is still labeled as "ideologically moti-
vated";115 feminist writers with whom one disagrees are still called "radi-
cal."11 6 In response to such behavior, feminists (and Friends of
Feminism) must simply hold firm and remind everyone that "to expose
the ideology inherent in 'neutral' scholarship ... does not necessarily
leave scholars with only a mindless relativism that disregards evidence
and logic."11 7 As Evelyn Fox Keller makes clear, the feminist project is
not to
abandon the quintessentially human effort to understand the
world in rational terms [but rather] to refine that effort. To do
this, we need to add to the familiar methods of rational and
empirical inquiry the additional process of critical self-reflec-
tion.... In this way, we can become conscious of the features
of the scientific project that belie its claim to universality.'
Third, while feminism as a scholarly movement arose from what
was earlier called the "women's liberation movement," feminism is not
the only discipline with political origins and political implications.
Think, for example, of ecology and economics. Ecology originated in
popular environmental activism that necessarily turned to the academy
for critical investigation of its suspicions and claims. Its politically based
agenda transformed the way that a variety of disciplines-chemistry, zo-
115. See Aiken et al., supra note 12, at 111 (discussing how in on-going debate on curricu-
lum integration, scholarly authority of women was contested by men labelling their assertions
as "ideologically motivated" while "leaving the ideological grounding of their own epistemolo-
gies unexplored").
116. Posner, supra note 27, at 516. But see Gillian K. Hadfield, Not the 'Radlcal'Feminist
Critique of 'Sex and Reason', 25 CONN. L. RaV. 533 (1993).
117. Aiken et al., supra note 12, at 111. Aiken noted that "when feminists challenge the
very idea of neutrality in scholarship .... they may be ... accused of 'rampant relativism' and
of replacing academic standards with ideological frameworks." Id. at 121.
118. Keller, supra note 57, at 238.
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ology, urban studies-were studied and made no bones about the social
and political uses to which its findings would be put. Similarly, econom-
ics established itself in Enlightenment political controversies about trade
policy. Even now-and most certainly in its law and economics incarna-
tion-economics is clearly identified with a particular political orienta-
tion. Law schools nonetheless seem quite happy to seek out economists
for faculty positions with little objection that the "politics" of law and
economics interfere with anyone's intellectual rigor.
The fourth and final response to the allegation that feminism is just
political rant is this: To the extent a feminist claim appears too heated,
too emotional, too querulous, too undisciplined, too whatever, the acad-
emy is exactly the right place for disputation. The argument has been
made with regard to feminist literary criticism:
[T]he only way in which feminist criticism can enter the acade-
mies and make its way there is as a new knowledge which en-
tertains its fundamental tenets as hypotheses rather than
beliefs, and understands that such hypotheses will receive pro-
visional acceptance only for as long as they are able to with-
stand attempts to disconfirm them.119
Such attempts are a proper response for those to whom feminism makes
insufficient sense. Indeed, as John Siliciano has argued, legal scholars
dissatisfied with feminism have something close to an "intellectual obli-
gation to challenge the excesses of feminist thought, to test its assump-
tions and hypotheses, in short, to give it the kind of rigorous assessment
that it deserves and that it needs if it is to successfully transplant some
version of itself into popular culture and thought."' 2 °
So far, however, the scholars most likely to take on the assumptions,
hypotheses, and excesses of feminism have been other feminists. The ex-
planation is probably a mixture of men's uncertainty about the rules of
engagement, 12 1 an unfamiliarity with feminist vocabulary and shorthand,
and perhaps some disdain for an upstart enterprise that is, without ques-
tion, still finding its way. At the same time, feminists with all their vary-
ing adjectives have a huge interest in getting things straight; remember
that feminism takes its political obligations seriously. That is why femi-
119. RUTHVEN, supra note 16, at 14.
120. Siliciano, supra note 103, at 462.
121. "When it comes to contesting ideas with women, particularly women who bring any
degree of passion to the debate, many men tend to lose their bearings." Id. The whole thing
would be much easier if feminists and their critics would follow the guidelines suggested by
Professor Siliciano: "Show respect. Listen. Look for value. Focus on the specific and the
tangible. Talk straight. Avoid polemics and ridicule." Id. at 463.
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nist legal scholars are increasingly willing to challenge one another re-
garding tactics, theories, and goals.
IV. LAW AND FEMINISM
How then does one go about doing "law and feminism?" One ap-
proach would be to see how feminism fits into the kinds of interdiscipli-
nary activities with which law is already familiar. These include
borrowing across disciplines, collaborative problem solving, and the de-
velopment of new fields from discrete but overlapping disciplines. 2 If
we take this list as a guide, feminism's interdisciplinary status seems sol-
idly in place. Law and legal scholarship in general have begun to "bor-
row" from feminist methodology by attending increasingly to the
experiences of the regulated as a basis for evaluating legal regulation and
by widening the range of sources from which information is sought. Law
also "borrows"-indeed, at times has thrust upon it-feminist scholar-
ship from other disciplines. Sociologist Lenore Weitzman's work on the
economic consequences of divorce,123 economist Victor Fuchs's conclu-
sions about the consequences of child raising on women's employ-
ment,124 and political theorist Susan Okin's analysis of the relation
between justice and family life' 25 present data and analyses to which law
must attend. Feminism has also participated in the development of new
legal fields concocted from overlapping disciplines. For example, in the
area of dispute resolution, a combination of procedure, justice, and game
theory, feminist concerns have served both as catalyst and critique.' 26
Yet while feminism fits easily into these accepted categories of inter-
disciplinary ventures, I reinstate my initial claim that interdisciplinarity
is too limited a conceptualization of the relationship between feminism
and law. In the first place, interdisciplinary study is often seen as a kind
of academic luxury; we will make the contacts, encourage the cross list-
ings, hire the specialist and develop the materials as time, money, and
energy permit.
122. See KLEIN, supra note 46. These are generally familiar to legal education and legal
practice. Borrowing across disciplines is, for example, what expert witnesses are about. Simi-
larly, lawyers now engage increasingly in collaborative problem solving, or what we might
think of as interdisciplinarity in action; the composition of hospital ethics committees across
fields of training is a familiar example.
123. LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985).
124. VICTOR FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY (1988).
125. OKIN, supra note 24.
126. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
L.J. 1545 (1991); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Wo-
men's Lawyering Process, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985).
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More importantly, the feminist argument with regard to curricular
reform and transformation is not staked to the notion of disciplinarity.
For whether or not feminism is a separate discipline in a formal academic
sense, it represents a set of issues crucial to the integrity of law's own
disciplinarity. If we are serious that the study of law has something to do
with just rules and fair practices, then the inclusion of feminist concerns
within the law school curriculum is assured.
To demonstrate the ease with which feminism can be incorporated
into the regular curriculum, I want to engage in some quick "show and
tell," using a first-year contracts course as the model.127 In fairness, I
use the word "ease" to refer more to the abundance and applicability of
good materials than to professorial comfort. I acknowledge that an ele-
ment of bravery may be required in taking on anything labeled or per-
ceived as "feminist," for as we have discussed, the word alone is fraught:
What is it? Will I get it right? What if I get it wrong?
This kind of pedagogical anxiety is not completely new to law
schools, although up to now it has been reserved primarily for those who
teach criminal law and must decide what to do about rape. Many crimi-
nal law professors simply choose not to teach rape in order to avoid the
potential risks of student and professorial uneasiness, hostility, and con-
flict. 112 Others do not teach it on "principle," unwilling to be pushed
around by feminists. In deciding not to include rape in his criminal law
class, James Tomkovicz recalled that "[u]nlike the authors of the
casebook [who in the latest edition had included materials on rape], I was
not going to kowtow to any interest group; I was not going to be blown
off course by the winds of a transient movement."
129
127. I put to one side such courses as Feminist Jurisprudence and Women and the Law, on
the understanding that those who teach those courses will already have in hand materials,
pedagogical goals, and so on.
Because I am concerned here with introducing students to feminism as a matter of sub-
stantive law, I do not address feminism as a pedagogical practice, though a growing body of
literature addresses the differences gender makes in the work of our classrooms. See, e.g.,
MARY F. BELENKY ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF,
VOICE, AND MIND (1986).
128. See Nancy S. Erickson & Nadine Taub, Final Report: Sex Bias in the Teaching of
Criminal Law, 42 RuTGERS L. REV. 309, 340 (1990).
129. James J. Tomkovicz, On Teaching Rape: Reasons, Risks, and Rewards, 102 YALE L.J.
481, 483 (1992) (concluding that teaching rape was difficult but worth effort and not including
rape in future would only be for good reasons).
Tomkovicz reports that he has never been urged to teach rape by a male colleague, and
wonders if "the women who have exhorted me to teach rape might be a little less avid in doing
so if they could trade places with me and experience the risk first hand." Id. at 493 n.36. But
surely this is not a matter of gender daring; many family law professors are women and teach
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There is, however, some progress. Most standard textbooks now in-
clude materials on rape and an increasing number of criminal law profes-
sors, including Professor Tomkovicz, are brave enough to use them.
Surely in time, rape's inclusion will seem inevitable, if only because, as
Susan Estrich observes, "our job is to teach what is significant in our
fields [and] [i]n criminal law, rape is significant, and worth our atten-
tion."13 This is not simply because rape concerns women. Rape is also
an excellent vehicle for teaching issues of consent, theories of criminality,
line-drawing, and so on. According to Estrich, this is why, if syllabus-
push comes to syllabus-shove, rape stays in-even at the expense of Re-
gina v. Dudley & Stephens131 and cannibalism:
I can think of no subject of substantive criminal law in greater
ferment, no area where the concepts that are at the core of the
"general course" come alive so vividly, and none that demon-
strates some of the dilemmas of criminalization and just pun-
ishment so clearly as the law of rape. 132
Incorporating feminism into contracts is probably an easier emo-
tional task in that the disadvantages women suffer contractually are usu-
ally not physical, putting aside debates about prostitution, pornography,
workplace safety, and surrogacy. Thus, incorporating women into con-
tracts is less loaded-the subject of women could come up in almost any
substantive area. It is, of course, not necessary that women serve as a
focal point in every area; the aim here is not the inversion of hierarchies,
but rather the sensible, appropriate inclusion of women.
A. Teaching Standard Doctrine with Gendered Cases
I begin with the substitution of cases to teach ordinary points of law
that discuss or implicitly rely on gender differences for cases that do not.
The idea here is that of the academic "twofer." Certain topics involving
women, like rape in criminal law, provide two pedagogical benefits-con-
ceptual rules and gender critique-for the price of one lesson.
An excellent example of this is the surrogacy case of Baby M 133
Where else can you get discussions of bargaining, breach, consent, con-
sideration, disclosure, duress, illegality, incapacity, public policy, role of
marital rape, which presents the same set of problems, especially when students have not been
exposed to the subject at all in their first year.
130. Susan Estrich, Teaching Rape Laws, 102 YALE L.J. 509, 520 (1992).
131. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
132. Estrich, supra note 130, at 516.
133. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); see Majorie M. Shultz, The Gendered
Curriculum: Of Contracts and Careers, 77 IowA L. REv. 55, 61-63 (1991).
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counsel, specific performance, statutory authority, third-party benefi-
ciaries, and unfairness, all in one compelling case with which students
are already familiar?134 Beyond these doctrinal basics, the case raises
more complex issues such as commodification, choice of law-is this con-
tracts or custody?-and limitations on contract itself. Each of these top-
ics can be played out further in the context of gender. Is surrogacy a
matter of gender exploitation or of reproductive autonomy? Why are
gestational services subject to different regulation than the sale of sperm?
And so on. It is worth pointing out, though class discussion will quickly
make this clear, that there are no obvious or agreed upon feminist an-
swers to these questions.
While Baby M. works very well, I want to introduce a second case,
less comprehensive in scope than Baby M. but that has its own virtues.
The case, Simeone v. Simeone,135 concerning the validity of a prenuptial
contract, could be used in sections on duress or in what Professors Farns-
worth and Young call "policing the bargain." '136 The case is appealing in
several respects. First, compared to Baby M., it does not take on the
complicated world of reproductive choice that, even for the hearty, can
be a challenge in class. Second, in Simeone the court explicitly connected
the status of women in society to the logic of its decision. 137 Whether or
not the court is correct may matter less than the fact that the court itself
raised the issue.138 This may be especially helpful for women professors
134. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONTRACTS 442 (1988).
135. 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990).
136. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 134, at 289.
137. Simeone, 581 A.2d at 165.
138. Borelli v. Brousseau is a second case where the court, or at least the dissent, explicitly
locates its decision in the modem status of gender relations. 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 16 (1993). In Borelli, a wealthy husband had a stroke. Because he did not want to be
cared for at a private nursing home, his wife agreed that she would quit her job and take care
of him at home in exchange for his promise to leave her certain property at his death. Id. at
651, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17-18. The husband died without leaving wife the property. Id., 16
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18. In deciding that their contract was not supported by consideration, the
court upheld "the long standing rule that a spouse is not entitled to compensation for support.
... Personal performance of a personal duty created by the contract of marriage does not
constitute a new consideration supporting the indebtedness alleged in this case." Id. at 654, 16
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
The dissent disputed the majority's loyalty to the rule, arguing not that spouses are free
from the duty to support one another, but that because many wives work, they should not have
to perform those services personally. Id. at 659-60, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23-24. To agree to do
so, as the wife did here, should constitute satisfactory consideration: "[T]o contend in 1993
that such a contract is without consideration means that if Mrs. Clinton becomes ill President
Clinton must drop everything and personally care for her." Id. at 660, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24.
Both Borelli and Simeone raise questions of power and contract within marriage. Borelli
fits nicely into materials on consideration and complements Simeone well. In neither case is
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who, upon mentioning anything like "the status of women," know to
await the upward roll of student eyeballs in the "here-it-comes" or
"there-she-goes" mode.
Simeone falls into the "You Want Equality, I'll Give You Equality"
school of legal thought. The facts are straightforward. In 1975, thirty-
nine year old neurosurgeon marries twenty-three year old unemployed
nurse.139 "On the eve of the parties' wedding, [his] attorney presented
[her] with a prenuptial agreement to be signed," which she did "without
benefit of counsel."'" The agreement provided that in case of separation
or divorce, Mrs. Simeone would receive a maximum of $25,000 in sup-
port payments, an amount paid out well within two years after their 1982
separation and before their divorce was tried. 141 Simeone presented two
standard issues in prenuptial cases: Was there duress and, absent duress,
were there policy reasons for policing a prenuptial contract differently
than other contracts? The specific issue here was whether the law re-
quired full disclosure to the wife of the statutory rights she waived by
virtue of the prenuptial agreement when the agreement itself made rea-
sonable provision for her.42
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided that full disclosure was
not required, relying heavily on its assessment of the improved status of
women in these feminist times. 143 As the court explained, the earlier re-
quirement of disclosure
rested upon a belief that spouses are of unequal status and that
women are not knowledgeable enough to understand the nature
of the contracts they enter. Society has advanced, however, to
the point where women are no longer regarded as the "weaker"
party in marriage, or in society generally. Indeed, the stereo-
type that women serve as homemakers while men work as
breadwinners is no longer viable .... Nor is there viability in
the presumption that women are uninformed, uneducated, and
readily subjected to unfair advantage in marital agreements. 44
The court concluded that "[p]aternalistic presumptions and protections
that arose to shelter women from the inferiorities and incapacities which
there a clear "feminist" position; both cases demonstrate the complexities of creating legal
rules in a context of social inequalities.
139. Simeone, 581 A.2d at 163.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 164.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 166-67.
144. Id. at 165.
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they were perceived as having in earlier times have, appropriately been
discarded." '
Simeone is a wonderful case in which to raise issues of fairness in
bargaining, heightened as they are by the majority's lodging its decision
in social facts about gender status. There is, of course, much to discuss
about the quality of the facts. The inferiorities women were perceived as
having? Women as homemakers or breadwinners? 46 No disadvantages
in marital agreements?147 No disadvantages in society?14 Is this a "no-
problem problem" or what?
The dissent in Simeone adds to the richness of the case as a teaching
device by considering the effect of marital status upon contract.1 49 It
offers an alternative set of policy reasons why prenuptial contracts should
be scrutinized, arguing that "the majority has given no weight to... the
state's paramount interest in ... the protection of parties to a marriage
who may be rendered wards of the state, unable to provide for their own
reasonable needs." ' s This suggests a different assessment of women's
occupational equality out there in "society in general." All this offers the
opportunity to raise a central issue in feminist theory, the sameness/dif-
ference debate.' Are women and men sufficiently alike in abilities and
circumstance so that they should be treated the same, or are there differ-
ences of a quality such that different legal rules are appropriate, indeed
desirable? Here the debate plays out with regard to the contractual ca-
pacities of the engaged. The majority votes show suspicious gusto for
sameness. The dissent prefers to err on the side of difference, primarily
to spare the state additional expense should women fare badly after all.
The issues raised in Simeone could easily parallel similar themes
raised in other first-year courses. That is, the pervasive method of femi-
nism can also be a coordinated pervasiveness. By consulting with col-
leagues in torts and criminal law, the question arises regarding whether
special relations between men and women should alter traditional duties.
For example, when studying the particular problems of acquaintance
rape in criminal law, one could introduce the critique of Beverly Balos
145. Id. Justice Papadakos concurred with the result but "fear[s] my colleague does not
live in the real world." Id. at 168 (Papadakos, J., concurring).
146. See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE
REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989).
147. See OKIN, supra note 24, at 134-39 (discussing vulnerability on account of marriage).
148. See FUCHS, supra note 124, at 60-64.
149. Simeone, 581 A.2d at 168 (McDermott, J., dissenting) ("I am not willing to believe
that our society views marriage as a mere contract for hire.").
150. Id. at 169-70 (McDermott, J., dissenting).
151. A good start is Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985).
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and Mary Lou Fellows, which suggests that current law has the standard
for consent to sex between acquaintances-if she knew him, she probably
consented-exactly backward. 5 2 In contrast, Fellows and Balos argue
that when a man and a woman meet under social circumstances, a confi-
dential relationship is created so that its breach would make it more, not
less, difficult to prove that any subsequent sex was consensual. One
could evaluate similar relational notions in torts, selecting from a range
of feminist critiques on gendered notions of harm and responsibility.15 3
One final point. As its caption suggests, Simeone is a dispute be-
tween relatives and so, like other cases of "domestic" promises and con-
tracts, it might be lodged in a course on family law. But if part of
feminism's project is to integrate the study of women genuinely into the
law school curriculum, then cases in which women make contracts need
to be in contracts too, even if the contracts concern family or procrea-
tional matters. As Marjorie Shultz has pointed out, conceptions of gen-
der hierarchies are perpetuated in law schools in part through the
"informal curriculum," the hierarchies of value attached to certain
courses, vocabularies, analyses.154 Thus, Professor Shultz notes:
Contracts as a field of theory and practice purports to be about
the market place, the public world, economic interests, and ra-
tional self-interested bargaining. By contrast, the family world
is deemed to be about the private, the personal, the altruistic,
the harmonious, the "squishy," warm-and-fuzzy side of life.155
Yet both courses involve many of the same conceptual issues as the rules
surrounding promises and theories of enforcement. Contracts is exactly
the right place to implant the idea that women are an intrinsic part of the
entire study of law and not just some side bar for girls, lefties, and family
practitioners.
B. Pre-Fab Case Critiques
A second approach is to entertain at regular intervals feminist
critiques of standard cases or themes. When teaching Lumley v. Wag-
152. Beverly Balos & Mary Lou Fellows, Guilty of the Crime of Trust: Non-Stranger Rape,
75 MINN. L. REv. 599 (1991).
153. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3 (1988).
154. Shultz, supra note 133.
155. Id at 56. Yet, as Gillian Hadfield has observed, family metaphors-marriage, parent-
ing-were commonly used in a complex commercial setting by franchisors to describe their
"highly intimate and interdependent" relationships with franchisees. Gillian K. Hadfield,
Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV.
927, 963-64 (1990).
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ner,156 for example, one can supplement the case with Lea VanderVelde's
excellent detective work and analysis."5 7 After discovering that all the
prominent nineteenth-century American cases in which employees were
enjoined from working elsewhere involved women, indeed mostly ac-
tresses and opera singers, VanderVelde set out to understand why "on a
gender-neutral legal issue like an employee's right to quit, women's cases
would so considerably outnumber men's cases in a profession [stage]
where women worked alongside men." ' She locates the answer in the
historical meaning of women's fidelity, employment, and autonomy in
nineteenth-century legal culture.15 9 When addressing cohabitation con-
tracts, one can turn to Clare Dalton's analysis of power and gender in
contract law. 160 When considering the doctrine of indefiniteness, the re-
lational aspects of franchise agreements are well explored by Gillian
Hadfield. 161 Patricia Williams has threaded The Alchemy of Race and
Rights with observations about the reach and nature of commercial
transactions.
1 62
Another useful critique is Sharon Rush's article, Touchdowns, Tod-
dlers, and Taboos: On Paying College Athletes and Surrogate Contract
Mothers.163 Rush compares the societal demands for purity in our col-
lege athletes, enforced through NCAA restrictions on player payments as
a requirement of eligibility status, with similar expectations about women
as mothers, enforced by limitations on pregnancy contracts. Because the
article is long, one could omit the sections on motherhood and use just
the materials on athletics. This serves several purposes. First, the class
itself might draw links between the rationale in the sports cases to other
circumstances where contracts or "deals" are understood to taint a par-
ticular status. Second, limiting the reading to restrictions on athletes also
gives feminism a better name, not that the word has to come up at all in
this context. We should keep in mind that feminism is concerned with
disadvantage on account of gender. Without question, in most cases this
means women. But, as with the early sex discrimination cases which
156. 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 693 (1852).
157. Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men's
Consciences and Women's Fidelity, 101 YALE L.J. 775, 777-82 (1992).
158. Id. at 777.
159. Id. at 777-82.
160. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997
(1985).
161. Hadfield, supra note 155, at 965 (describing franchise agreements as "mutual obliga-
tions embedded in an intimate interdependence among equals").
162. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
163. Sharon E. Rush, Touchdowns, Toddlers, and Taboos: On Paying College Athletes and
Surrogate Contract Mothers, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 549 (1989).
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vindicated the fights of men,' feminist scholarship is also informed by
ways in which law constructs men as a social category.
Another resource is Mary Joe Frug's Re-reading Contracts: A Femi-
nist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook.165 While the article may be more
appropriate for teachers than students, I sometimes assign the introduc-
tory explanation in which Frug creates eight fictional law student
"types"-the "feminist," the "reader with a chip on his shoulder," the
"individualist," and so on-each character drawn with special attention
to his or her attitudes about gender.1 66 Frug uses these personality
vignettes to demonstrate a point central to the feminist critique of objec-
tive knowledge: Readers react differently to cases, casebooks, and legal
rules, in part because of who each reader is, and where in the social,
gender, and political order the reader is located. The eight characters-
one can invent replacements if these seem unrepresentative-are also
useful in that they can serve as dummies for arguments that class mem-
bers themselves may be reluctant to make.
An advantage of Frug's article is that it enables first-year students to
look at all of their casebooks more critically. They, and we, can decide if
Frug's observations regarding editors' selection of particular kinds of wo-
men doing particular kinds of things create stereotypic or negative por-
trayals of women in contrast to the representations of men. 167
A disadvantage of the Frug article is that it may be hard for first-
year students to comprehend a critique before they have grasped what a
casebook is at all. There may also be an element of foolhardiness in criti-
cizing too quickly the book for which one has just ordered students to
shell out fifty dollars. Little doubt remains, however, that professors
should read the piece, and not just to crib the history of Amelia Bloomer
to enhance one's teaching of Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp. 168
The materials mentioned in this section are part of an increasing
literature on the relationship between gender and contract law. A sub-
section of the Women in Legal Education Section of the Association of
American Law Schools now keeps a bibliography of these materials; op-
164. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
165. Mary Joe Frug, Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34
AM. U. L. REv. 1065 (1985).
166. Id at 1070-74.
167. There are also specific feminist critiques of casebooks in the other first-year subjects.
168. See Frug, supra note 165, at 1119-20 (discussing Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176, 474 P.2d 689, 89 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1970)).
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erators are standing by to take your call. 1 69 The aim is that in time such
materials will not be supplementary, as law moves closer toward "phase-
five" status where knowledge is "redefined, reconstructed to include us
all."
170
C. Multidisciplinary Materials
There is no reason to limit ventures in "law and..." only to pairs.
That is, one can teach law and history and feminism, or law and femi-
nism and economics. Two excellent readings which offer these particular
combinations are Michael Grossberg's chapter on broken engagements,
Broken Promises: Judges and the Law of Courtship,171 and Ian Ayres's
article Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Sales Ne-
gotiations.1 72 Because readers are more likely to be familiar with the lat-
ter, I focus here on Grossberg's work.
The chapter, an analysis of the rise and fall of the breach-of-prom-
ise-to-marry suit, wonderfully connects social and political history with
the development of contract doctrine. In discussing why judges early in
the century favored the suit, Grossberg introduces readers to the
problems of spinsterhood, not as an individual psychological predica-
ment a la the twentieth-century cartoon character Cathy, but as a public
matter of great concern. The promise to marry was an agreement "upon
which the 'interest of all civilized countries so essentially depends.' "173
Damages were initially high because of the serious reputational and fi-
nancial losses to the young woman who would now remain single forever
(and to her family who would now support her forever).
174
Grossberg discusses seduction, chastity, jury composition, and wo-
men's changing occupational opportunities to show how social, financial,
and political considerations all shaped judicial attitudes toward the cause
of action. The limited options of women as actors with regard to court-
ship, to employment, to sex, to property, and to family life-what might
be considered the "feminist concerns"-necessarily inform the discus-
sion. Broken Promises demonstrates the fluidity of contract doctrine in
169. Or you can write to the Committee on Teaching of Contracts, AALS Section on Wo-
men in Legal Education.
170. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
171. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 33-64 (1985).
172. Ayres, supra note 94.
173. GROSSBERG, supra note 171, at 36 (quoting Wightman v. Coates, 15 Mass. 2, 3
(1818)).
174. On the economic incentives to marry, see LEE V. CHAMBERS-SCHILLER, "Hymen's
Recruiting Sargeant": Factors Influencing the Rate of Marriage, in LIBERTY, A BETTER Hus-
BAND: SINGLE WOMEN IN AMERICA: THE GENERATIONS OF 1780-1840, at 29 (1984).
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relation to changing cultural values. As women became less economi-
cally dependent on husbands or fathers because of increased work oppor-
tunities, the cause of action fell into increasing disfavor.
Despite initial mass scoffing at the idea that anyone could ever have
gone to court for "breaking up," I find students tremendously engaged
by Broken Promises. In addition to its own rewards, the chapter nicely
sets the stage for such cases as Ricketts v. Scothorn 175 by contextualizing
the importance of economic security for young women. The materials
also foreshadow the issues in Baby M. ,176 the problems of promise and
breach in the creation of intimate relationships.
V. CONCLUSION
Some readers might still agree with the Tiger Lily that simply noth-
ing can be done about the shape of feminism's petals; she cannot be a
flower. Still others might argue that she can, but that the correct species
would be trifid, her goal not to flourish among the others but to devour
them. Many feminists would argue that the image itself is all wrong:
Feminism in academia is less like strolling in a garden than "dancing
through a mine-field," in Annette Kolodny's phrase.177
My view is that of course feminism belongs in the garden, inhospita-
ble as that location may sometimes be. Indeed, feminism's roots within
the disciplinary garden are already quite deep. That is because feminism
is less a transplant than a variety rather like the others but for having
gone untended for centuries. Women have always been there. It seems
almost silly now to think in "phase-one" terms: How could there ever
have been "womenless" history or literature or law? Yet many of us
were trained and educated-frustrated and bewildered-within exactly
such constructs.
But that garden, once thought to be the very measure of beauty, can
no longer grow unchecked. Whether feminism is considered as a sepa-
rate discipline or an inherent aspect of all of them, the place of women in
the world of knowledge is now established. Feminism now demands
equal access to sunlight and water-that is, to funding, students, curricu-
lar inclusion, and collegial respect. The inquiry has shifted from the
shape of feminism's petals to the contours of the garden as a whole.
The resulting panic-a fear of pruning-is not surprising, for as Kolodny
explains:
175. 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
176. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
177. Kolodny, supra note 23, at 23.
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What is really being bewailed in the claims that [feminists] dis-
tort texts or threaten the disappearance of the great western
literary tradition itself is not so much the disappearance of
either text or tradition but instead, the eclipse of that particular
form of the text, and that particular shape of the canon, which
previously reified male readers' sense of power and significance
in the world.178
The legal canon is under similar reconstruction as feminist concerns
about the just treatment of women become part of what lawyers are ex-
pected to know. In this regard, feminism as a subject is like ethics.
Rarely taught with vigor or purpose in pre-Watergate legal education,
the question is now how to teach ethics well-a separate course or perva-
sive integration-rather than whether to teach it at all. The transforma-
tion with regard to feminism may be slower than it was with ethics-no
scandals have yet emerged to alert state legislatures that the bar needs
instruction in feminism, although the 1991 Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas
controversy was something of a start. Of course, as law professors, we
ought not wait for orders on this matter. The case for including femi-
nism throughout the curriculum is already clear and strong enough.
Things could, of course, be easier. Feminism could use more of the
institutional support received by other disciplines linked to law. Teach-
ing feminism, even if one commits to do it only a few times a semester, is
hard work. The theories and vocabularies are new to many and, at this
stage of the process anyway, gender tensions are still in play. Feminism
needs the equivalent of the John M. Olin Fund and the George Mason
University Law and Economics Center-or the Fund and Center them-
selves in a generous interdisciplinary gesture-to set up summer sessions,
finance seminars, and fund faculty research in feminism so that its inte-
gration into law schools-like that of the integration of economics-be-
comes more accepted and accessible.
In addition, the integration of women into law might be easier if we
keep a collective eye on the purpose of the feminist enterprise. As Janet
Radcliffe Richards reminds us, feminism is not concerned with "a group
of people it wants to benefit, but with a type of injustice it wants to elimi-
nate."17 9 The goal is not for "inversions of traditional habits ... as one
ruling group replaces another."18 0 Thus, we might ditch the concept of
feminists as "femagogues," in John Le Carre's clever phrase,"8 and in-
178. Id. at 29.
179. RICHARDS, supra note 95, at 17-18.
180. Young-Bruehl, supra note 74, at 20.
181. JOHN LE CARRE, THE NIGHT MANAGER 7 (1993).
November 1993]
268 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:225
stead take up Charlotte Perkins Gilman's appealing and undisciplined
portrait of the "feminist":
Here she comes, running, out of prison, and off pedestal; chains
off, crown off, halo off, just a live woman.
1 82
182. Corr, supra note 18, at 37.
